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Abstract— This paper presents the results of the test application 
of the Legal Case on ACAS X, the new generation airborne 
collision avoidance system. The Legal Case is the novel 
methodology, recently developed by the ALIAS project, to 
address liability of innovative systems for aviation and ATM. The 
Legal Case application on ACAS X was conducted in cooperation 
with EUROCONTROL; IATA, air companies and industries. 
Results are meant to inform ACAS X’s future development. 
Liability allocation; ACAS X; Legal Case methodology; 
Aviation products liability  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyses the liability issues of the new 
generation Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS X). The legal 
analysis was carried out by means of the Legal Case, which is a 
novel methodology to assess the legal risk of innovative 
aviation technologies. The Legal Case prototype was launched 
in 2013 as main outcome of the ALIAS I project (Addressing 
Liability Impact of Automated Systems) and is currently being 
validated in the framework of ALIAS II, which was funded as 
follow up activity.  
ACAS X was selected as a suitable technology to undergo a 
test application as part of the validation of the Legal Case 
methodology. The activity was supported by 
EUROCONTROL, IATA, aviation industries and air 
companies, who directly participated in the test application as 
user group of the Legal Case process. These bodies have most 
ownership of and responsibility for the deployment stage of the 
ACAS X technology. 
Due to space constraints, the paper only discusses potential 
liability implications of one specific design choice, namely 
different options for the treatment of Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) aircraft position data. It 
illustrates how liability considerations can affect design 
choices and the development process if opportunely taken into 
account.  
The paper is organised as follows:  
 section II provides a framework on liability and 
automation in future aviation scenario.  
 section III presents an overview of the Legal Case 
methodology 
 section IV presents the test application of the Legal 
Case on the ACAS X concept  
 section V provides results and recommendations  
 section VI addresses final considerations  
II. LIABILITIES AND AUTOMATION 
 
Human Performance studies on the development of new 
ATM technologies increasingly conclude with the 
recommendation to investigate liability issues associated with 
the use of highly automated systems, as they are likely to 
constrain the acceptability by the end-users. The reports of 
validation studies often provide a list of such issues, 
recommending further investigation, but no action is taken to 
address them at the validation stage1.  
The increasing automation foreseen for the future ATM 
[1][2], while augmenting capacity, safety and efficiency, will 
likely change the tasks of operators, making them more 
dependent on data and information that someone else, 
including automated tools, has previously selected or approved 
as reliable. Such a change would demand for a critical 
                                                          
1 An example is the recent Human Factors studies on Performance Based 
Navigation (PBN). The utilisation of the aircraft PBN capability aims at 
providing more route options, by enabling a route structure design with closer 
lateral spacing which, while not adversely impacting safety, creates a more 
efficient use of the available controlled airspace. This is primarily done using 
Close Route Spacing (CRS). CRS implements closely spaced, pre-defined 2D 
routes, under the assumptions that: i) ATCOs can place a very high degree of 
reliance on the aircraft capability to consistently navigate to a high degree of 
accuracy and predictability; ii) Flight crews can monitor the actual airborne 
PBN performance through the On-board Performance Alerting and 
Monitoring (OPMA) system. The PBN concept foresees a sort of monitoring 
delegation from ATCOs to crew, thanks to the availability of the OPMA 
system. The results of the PBN studies recommended to engage more effort in 
the investigation of the balance of responsibility between ground and airborne 
side in monitoring the aircraft trajectory during normal operations as well as in 
case of emergency procedures, such as the undetected degradation of the PBN 
capabilities (i.e. without an alert from the airborne OPMA system). Liability 
issues associated to the balance of responsibility between crew and controllers 
are elements that can constrain the acceptability of this new technology, that 
otherwise (i.e. from the human factors point of view) would be considered 
suitable and feasible to implement. 
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revision on the actual human contribution to the performance 
of complex socio-technical systems, and consequently, on the 
criteria for the allocation of liability [3]. Two main questions 
are considered prominent in this context: 
 to what extent the use of new automatic tools may shift 
liability for accidents from operators to technology, 
namely from operators to manufacturers, system 
designers and aviation organizations such as Air 
Navigation Service Providers, certificatory Agencies, 
etc; 
 whether current liability regimes at both national and 
international levels are suitable to address failures 
related to automated technologies, having developed a 
clear methodological legal framework and tools.  
The ALIAS Project is promoting the idea that the ways in 
which liabilities are attributed and distributed among the 
stakeholders2  (and  their  possible  effects  in  terms  of 
stakeholders’ acceptability) have to be properly taken into 
account during the design process, according to a new 
approach that we have called “design according to liabilities” 
[4]. The idea is that addressing liability issues proactively 
(i.e. earlier in the design process) would be easier, less 
costly and controversial than at later stages, when the system 
is deployed. 
 
The design according to liabilities entails not only a change 
of perspective within the user-centered design methodology, 
but also a new approach towards liability. Such an approach 
looks at liability as one of the inherent properties of an ATM 
system, being it likely to affect stakeholders’ acceptability and 
constrain technological deployment, in the same way as safety 
and human performance.  
III. LEGAL CASE 
The Legal Case addresses the legal risks for the different 
stakeholders involved in the design and implementation 
process of a certain technology. A legal risk concerns the 
probability of an unwanted legal outcome (i.e to be ordered to 
pay damages), as a consequence of uncertain factual 
circumstances (i.e an accident) and/or uncertain future legal 
decisions (i.e. the decision taken by a judge). The legal case is 
meant to detect any issues pertaining to the allocation of 
liabilities and to address such issues before system’s 
deployment, through convenient technological adaptations or 
legal arrangements. 
 
A. THE LEGAL CASE PROCESS 
 
As shown in Fig. 1, the Legal Case outlines a 4-stepped 
process, where each step (rectangles in the diagram) works as 
input for the subsequent one. After collecting background 
information on the technology (Step 1), the liability risks for all 
involved stakeholders are identified (Step 2). Legal measures to 
mitigate unbalances are then proposed, which undergo 
                                                          
2 For an analysis of liability relations with regard to 
automation in aviation, see [5] 
stakeholders’ acceptability (Step 3). The results of the 
assessment of the technology are collected in the Legal Case 
Report (Step 4).  
 
Figure 1: The Legal Case process 
During Step 3 the legal measures proposed to mitigate the 
liability risks identified above are presented to the stakeholders 
and discussed in a structured way. If all the stakeholders agree 
on the legal measures produced as results of the legal analysis 
carried out in Steps 2 and 3, the information on liability 
attribution and measures is included in the concept 
documentation. This information will be implemented into 
contractual and other private regulations or into 
recommendations to public authorities. Otherwise, if a general 
agreement on the proposed measures cannot be found, the 
parties will reconsider whether a different legal design should 
be adopted or whether the allocation of tasks and the 
operational concepts associated with the technology should 
also be reviewed. In the latter case, the results of the safety and 
human-performance cases (if already carried out as it is likely 
to happen) may also have to be re-examined. 
A set of supporting tools –such as tables to evaluate levels 
of automation and identify tasks and duties, flow diagrams to 
guide the assessment process, tables and reports– sustain the 
application process.  
IV. LEGAL CASE APPLICATION TO THE ACAS X CONCEPT  
In the following we present the results of the Legal Case 
test application on ACAS X. 
The research on the ACAS X technology started in 2008, 
funded by the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and 
was carried out in collaborations with the Lincoln Laboratory 
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Computer 
Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. The new system 
is based on dynamic programming and - if successful - will 
ultimately replace the current generation of systems 
ACAS/TCAS II (Traffic Collision Avoidance System). 
Dynamic programming allows generation of alerts using an 
off-line optimisation of utility; ACAS X is expected to address 
and alleviate technical limitations of the current system, in 
particular unnecessary advisories, operational limitations, long 
update cycles and suboptimal surveillance data use. ACAS X is 
also expected to reduce collision risk, provide increased 
adaptability to surveillance inputs and flexibility for operations. 
Importantly, this new concept of operations also enlarges the 
2
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classes of potential users as it provides for variants that could 
be deployed for General Aviation and Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft Systems (RPAS).  
Factors that influenced the choice of this technology to 
undergo Legal Case application included the level of maturity, 
the likelihood of deployment and the level of automation. 
ACAS X is a technology at an early stage of maturity. 
Therefore, the Legal Case application could inform the design 
from the legal and liability allocation perspective. ACAS X has 
a high level of automation[6][7]. Moreover, it affects several 
actors within the ATM system at the same time, in terms of 
responsibility and hence potentially liability, being situated at 
an intersection on the one hand between the air navigation 
providers and airlines, and on the other hand between ATCOs 
and pilots. In addition, ACAS X has a strong human-machine 
component. Human factor effects will be relevant to its 
development and use. Finally, ACAS X has many similarities 
with TCAS II for which legal analyses could be retrieved from 
the case law. 
A. The ACAS X operational concept 
Whilst remaining operationally similar to TCAS II, ACAS 
X presents important functional differences. Both systems 
work in the collision avoidance layer of ICAO’s conflict 
management system and issue TAs (Traffic Advisories) and 
RAs (Resolution Advisories) to pilots. The types of alerts 
foreseen by the ACAS X concept of operations are identical to 
those issued by TCAS II, but their presence, timing, sequence 
and efficiency may be different. 
ACAS X will differ from the previous generation of ACAS 
in several respects. First, it can use a wider range of 
surveillance sources (e.g. transponder interrogations, ADS-B, 
ADS-R, electro-optical). Secondly, it has a new internal logic 
TRM (Threat Resolution Module) based on numeric lookup 
tables. The new collision avoidance logic can be optimised for 
different surveillance sources, operating environments and 
operational requirements.  
Currently four variants of ACAS X have been envisaged: 
ACAS Xa, ACAS Xp, ACAS Xo, ACAS Xu.3 Amongst these 
variants, ACAS Xa is an active version of ACAS X, which 
uses active interrogation/reply protocols and Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and is intended 
to be a direct replacement for TCAS II. ACAS Xo allows 
compatibility with special operations beyond the scope of 
ACAS Xa, such as Closely Spaced Parallel Operations; ACAS 
Xp, will use only passive ADS-B surveillance and is intended 
for general aviation. Finally, ACAS Xu is customized for 
Unmanned Airborne Systems (UAS).  
In terms of maturity, the overall ACAS X concept has 
passed the feasibility stage (v2 of the EOCVM concept 
lifecycle model) [8]and is now at a stage of pre-industrial 
development and integration (v3). ACAS Xa is the most 
advanced at v3, while the other variants are less mature. ACAS 
                                                          
3 In this paper we will use the generic name ACAS X, unless we specifically 
refer to one of four versions of ACAS X. 
Xu and ACAS Xo are at a v2 level of maturity, while ACAS 
Xp is at v1. It is planned for ACAS Xo to be standardised and 
introduced into service at the same time as ACAS Xa, that is, 
to be commercially available in the early 2020s. The concept of 
operation does not foresee ACAS X to be mandatory in the US 
regulatory framework; while in the European context the 
question has not been addressed yet. ACAS X is envisioned to 
be fully backwards compatible and interoperable with current 
TCAS. 
B. ADS-B Design Choice 
The treatment of unvalidated ADS-B positions by ACAS 
X emerged as one of the controversial design issues with 
respect to liability. While the issues concerning ADS-B data 
are more general than their use for ACAS X, and may be 
explored in a broader way, nevertheless they have a direct 
impact on the ACAS X design.  In the following, the results of 
the analysis of the corresponding design options are discussed. 
ADS-B data is a satellite based broadcast surveillance 
technology. ADS-B equipment will be mandated widely by 
legislation entering into force in 2020 in the United States4, 
and in 2017 in the EU. While TCAS II relies on secondary 
surveillance radar transponder signals, Xa will have active 
means to collect surveillance data. Xp will rely on “passive” 
surveillance data, which does not use active 
interrogation/reply protocols, but only ADS-B surveillance. 
The ACAS X system’s incorporation of new surveillance data 
sources, such as ADS-B, is one of the key changes foreseen. 
ADS-B is viewed as an enabler in the change from radar based 
towards satellite based aircraft location systems.  
One of the current controversies is how ACAS X should 
process (unvalidated) ADS-B tracks. ‘Unvalidated’ refers to 
positions which are solely based on ADS-B data, not validated 
through other surveillance data sources. The design options 
currently debated are 1) not to show positions based on ADS-
B data at all, 2) to display such positions in a distinct way 
from other positions, without the possibility of generating a 
TA 3) to display them in a distinct way from other positions, 
with a warning such as a TA, but no RA 4) to treat them 
indifferently from other positions and issue TAs and RAs in 
regular fashion. 
From a safety perspective, it was debated in the user group 
whether ADS-B data is less reliable, and whether this issue 
can be overcome through certification. Additionally, the risk 
of spoofing –i.e., of fake ADS-B signals being created– was 
specifically addressed. In particular, the adoption of additional 
security measures such as encryption, and the effect of 
certification on spoof-proofing of ADS-B were discussed[9]. 
The mere display of ADS-B data (i.e. Options 2 and 3) was 
questioned from a functional perspective, arguing that the 
purpose of the ACAS X concept is collision avoidance and not 
traffic awareness.  
                                                          
4 14 CFR Part 91, Federal Rule published in the Federal Register on May 28, 
2010. 
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Lingering behind these opposing arguments is an 
additional concern, namely that of liability. What would 
happen if ACAS X were to issue an advisory based on 
ADS-B data, which ultimately proves faulty and causes an 
accident? Who is liable for providing and displaying faulty 
input data and who is liable for acting upon such data?  
C. The Level of Automation (LOAT) analysis of ADS-B 
options 
The Level Of Automation Taxonomy (LOAT), developed 
by SESAR 16.5.1[10], is used in the Legal Case to assess the 
levels of automation introduced by an ATM innovation and to 
determine the corresponding impacts on the division of tasks 
between humans and machines. The LOAT table provides 
criteria for assigning a level of automation to a technology with 
regard to different cognitive functions (information acquisition, 
information analysis, decision and action selection and action 
implementation).  
Below you can find the Supporting Table for the LOAT 
outcomes for the ADS-B design options currently discussed in 
the ACAS Xa variant. The following analysis was obtained as 
a result.  
Option 1 involves no technical support for positions based 
on ADS-B only data, therefore all responsibility for collision 
avoidance lies with the pilot and supporting processes (air 
traffic control, alternative air traffic awareness tools). Under 
Options 2 and 3, information acquisition is automated and 
therefore supported by the technology at a rather high level. 
The information analysis for unvalidated ADS-B positions on 
the other hand is only partially taken over by the system. 
Option 2 arguably requires greater efficacy from the pilot as 
s/he has to capture the visual display and is not, as in Option 3, 
aurally alerted by a TA for unvalidated ADS-B traffic.  
In Options 1-3, the pilot remains entirely responsible for 
both decision-making and action implementation. Additionally, 
the pilot is visually alerted that the positions displayed derive 
from unvalidated ADS-B sources. The ACAS X system 
therefore induces the pilot to question the reliability of the data 
processed in the system. At the same time, the decision-making 
and execution is left entirely to the pilot. In terms of 
responsibilities, this places the pilot in a dilemma as the data is 
presented visually distinct as ‘second class data’. Only in 
Option 4 does an unvalidated ADS-B position trigger a regular 
traffic advisory, resulting in automated decision-making and 
action selection.  
This analysis points to an inherent uncertainty: who should 
be responsible for taking the risk of selecting an action that is 
based on unvalidated ADS-B data: the technology (Option 4) 
or the pilot (Option 2-3)? In particular, the results of the LOAT 
analysis point to human-automation shifts in responsibility with 
respect to automated decision-making and action selection that 
deviate from the initial assessment of the ACAS Xa concept 
and the legacy of TCAS II. 
The LOAT analysis identifies shifts in task 
responsibilities, in particular between technology and humans. 
Task-responsibilities concern requirements pertaining to the 
correct performance of a certain task, by humans or 
technologies, and their violations may lead to liabilities. When 
the technology is at fault, producers or maintainers may be 
liable.  
V. STAKEHOLDER-BASED ANALYSIS OF LIABILITY 
ALLOCATION, INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS  
In the following we briefly summarize the results of the legal 
analysis. For each stakeholder, first the liabilities for the four 
design options are presented, then a short statement of the 
main rationale for such liability is provided, and finally the 
proposed liability mitigation measures are presented. 
A. Pilot/Air carrier liability allocation 
Based on the level of automation analysis, there is 
significant task-responsibility uncertainty with respect to the 
tasks allocated to the pilot in ADS-B only design options 2 and 
3. This was a prime concern expressed in the user group. 
In particular, our responsibility analysis shows that under 
design Options 2-3 the pilot remains entirely responsible for 
analysis of ADS-B data, and thus for decision-making and 
action implementation based on that analysis. In legal terms, 
this may translate in an increased duty of care for the pilot 
under Options 2-3, because he/she needs to take into account 
the additional data available and assess its reliability, which 
may entail a higher legal risk that his/her conduct may be 
considered negligent. Moreover, the larger responsibility for 
pilots under Options 2 and 3 may have an impact on air carrier 
liability. 
In fact, under such design options, it may be difficult for the 
air carrier to provide the proof that the damage was not due to 
the negligence of its servant (the pilot), a proof which is 
required for the air carrier liability to be limited, under 
international law5. Figure 2 presents the liability risk for the 
pilot under the different design options. 
 
Figure 2: Liability risk for pilot in ACAS X ADS-B only 
 
 
Figure 3: Liability risk for air carrier 
 
                                                          
5 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by 
Air - Montreal, 28 May 1999 
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Figure 4: Liability risk for manufacturer in ACAS X ADS-B only 
Air carrier liability for damages to passengers and baggage 
should be similar as under current TCAS configuration. Also in 
case of an accident causing damages on the surface, the 
liability risk for an air carrier responsible of an aircraft 
equipped with ACAS X would not be different from liability 
for an aircraft equipped with TCAS. 
Organisational liability will be a residual case of liability 
for air carriers: it is a kind of fault liability emerging when the 
harm can be directly related to or caused by business activity. 
The enterprise is at fault whenever it could have prevented the 
harm by adopting reasonable precautions, concerning in 
particular training, provision of adequate documentation, 
organizational management, and ensuring the overall safety of 
its activities. According to 
our analysis, the liability 
risk for organisational 
liability seems to be low. 
In order to limit the 
liability risk, measures 
were proposed that provide 
evidence that pilots’ actions 
were in line with 
professional due care. In 
particular, the task 
allocation should be 
enshrined in legally 
relevant documentation e.g. 
ACAS manual, PANS-OPS 
and training requirements 
should be captured in 
legally relevant 
documentation such as 
Chapter 5 of Doc. 9863 
(ACAS Manual) and in the 
attachments to Doc. 8168 
(PANS-OPS). Figure 3 
presents the main kinds of 
liability for air carriers. 
B. ATCO/ANSP 
The complexity problem for Options 2 and 3 was also 
identified for the ATCO position, aggravated by the fact that 
there are gaps in the current procedures for ACAS (in 
particular concerning training). After an RA, the ATCO ceases 
to be responsible for separation and may not interfere with the 
flight path. However, a professional duty could be construed 
according Paragraph 2.2. of Annex 11 of the Chicago 
Convention, according to which the ATCO should provide 
information useful for the “safe and efficient conduct of the 
flight”.  
In options 2) and 3) no RA is issued, only a TA and this 
may result in a higher degree of responsibility for the ATCO 
confronted with requests for clarification by pilots. Figure 5 
TABLE I.  LOAT OUTCOMES FOR THE ADS-B DESIGN OPTIONS 
  Information 
Acquisition
Informatio
n Analysis 
Decision & 
action selection 
Action 
implementation 
R-Impact Analysis 
1. No display of 
unvalidated ADS-B 
positions 
A0 
 
B0 
 
C0 
 
D0 
 
All responsibility on alternative processes/pilot. 
2. Display unvalidated 
ADS-B positions visually 
distinct, no advisory 
A4 
 
B2  C0 D0 System provides information only, pilot: large 
responsibility. 
3. Display unvalidated 
ADS-B positions visually 
distinct, plus traffic 
advisory  
A4 B3 C0 D0 Pilot: responsible for implementation, but has 
data available to ‘second guess’ the reliability of 
data processed in the system. 
4. Regular display and 
advice  
A5 B5 C4 D2 Execution left to pilot, all other factors to 
machine.  
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presents the liability risk for the ATCO under the different 
design options. 
 
Figure 5: Liability risk for ATCO in ACAS X ADS-B only  
Procedures must be clarified with respect to the obligations 
of the ATCO. The proposed liability mitigation measure 
consists in providing evidence that ATCOs’ actions were in 
line with professional due care. Guidelines for controller 
actions and training must be enshrined in official 
documentation. ATCO training requirements regarding ACAS 
are currently much less well developed than for pilots. 
C. Manufacturer liability  
Manufacturers6 are primarily liable for production defects, 
design defects or warning defects. ‘Net’ liability depends not 
only on initial liability risk, but also on the strengths of 
defences that may be applicable (most pertinent are the state of 
the art defence and the regulatory compliance defence). Figure 
4 shows the risk for manufacturer with regard to design defect 
and warning defect, under the different design options. 
Our analysis suggests several measures mitigating design 
defect risk. In particular, the risk can be addressed by (1) 
basing the design on scientific studies (specific concerns are 
the reliability of ADS-B data in general, and the exposure of 
signals to spoofing); (2) establishing the effects of certification 
on safety; and (3) exploring safety mechanism designs to limit 
exposure to ADS-B risks. The manufacturers’ liability defences 
can be strengthened by adopting common industry standards. 
To strengthen the ‘State of the Art defence’ common industry 
standards can be adopted in order to ensure that at least the 
customary standard of the industry practice can be met. 
Another factor that affects liability allocation is the scope of 
manufacturer discretion allowed by standard. Generally, with 
less discretion on manufacturers, their liability risk decreases, 
although compliance with standards and regulations does not 
necessarily exonerate a producer from liability. Therefore, in 
order to limit liability of manufacturers, the ADS-B design 
options ought to be mandated for all manufacturers. 
In order to address warning defect risks, it is suggested that 
manufacturers provide adequate warning information for the 
technology. The documentation should be designed taking into 
account in particular the requirements on technology 
information of ACAS laid down in the Barcelona Court of 
Appeal Judgment following the Überlingen mid-air collision7. 
Manufacturers can take additional liability allocation 
measures through contractual clauses concerning: (i) software 
components (ii) additional services such as installation, 
maintenance, etc., and (iii) insurance policies. In particular 
                                                          
6 “Manufacturers” here refers both to Aircraft Manufacturers and Avionics 
Manufacturers. While the two categories may have different responsibilities 
with regard to safety, they will be both subject to product liability laws. 
7 Audiencia Provincial (Court of Appeal) of Barcelona, Judgment n.230/2012, 
published on 8/5/2012. 
liability for failures of the prewritten ACAS X software 
component could be contractually severed from the liability of 
manufacturers. Responsibilities for maintenance, installation 
and resulting liabilities can be contractually addressed. 
Insurance clauses may be relevant, in particular it ought to be 
ensured that ‘spoofing’ type of incidents are not excluded 
through specific exclusion clauses. 
A final question concerns the liability of standardisation 
and certification bodies. This is an ill-defined area of tort law, 
where legal doctrine is still not well developed, giving rise to 
great uncertainty. However, in general terms, it can be said that 
a duty of care usually exists, and that standard setters and 
certification bodies may be liable for breaching such duty of 
care, by failing to take adequate precautions against foreseeable 
risks. In case of the ADS-B design options foreseeable risks 
concern the choice to provide ADS-B only data and to generate 
TAs and RAs. On the one hand, not providing information or 
instructions can increase the risk of collision with ADS-B only 
aircraft, which is considered one of the highest collision risks 
in the airspace. On the other hand, providing such data and 
instructions can increase the risk of accidents when the data are 
false or incorrect, for instance when resulting from spoofing. 
Therefore, scientific evidence is needed to asses this risks and 
determine whether the chosen option provides the optimal 
balance. Figure 6 presents the liability risk for the standard 
setter under the different design options. 
Concerning the liability mitigation measures for 
standardization and certification bodies, it is strongly suggested 
that such bodies assess their respective level of duty of care 
critically when setting standards and certifications. This 
implies determining whether (i) ADS-B data is less reliable 
than other data streams, and (ii) whether the reliability issue 
can successfully be addressed through certification. This is 
needed in order to ascertain whether a risk was foreseeable for 
the standardisation body, and whether the adopted measures 
will likely be judged by the courts as adequate precautions, on 
the basis of the available scientific evidence. The suggested 
measures should provide evidence that the standard setters 
complied with the duty of care.  
Concerning the liability allocation measures, it will be 
important to consider the impact of how the standard is written 
on liability, in particular whether manufacturers have 
discretion; and at which level of detail the standard is written. 
Generally, less discretion for manufacturers will decrease the 
liability risk (but not eliminate it). 
VI. RESULTS: APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL CASE TO ACAS X 
From the analysis carried out, it resulted that the main 
liabilities are on the air carrier and the manufacturer. Other 
liabilities are residual. However, air carrier liability is limited, 
and unlimited only to the extent that the pilot was negligent. 
Figure 6: Liability risk for standard setter in ACAS X ADS-B only
6
 
 
Fifth SESAR Innovation Days, 1st – 3rd December 2015
 
 
Consequently, principal liability claims can also be directed 
towards the manufacturer to obtain higher damages. 
Concerning the different design options for ADS-B, the 
legal analysis shows that under Options 1 and 4, the technology 
is in charge of all tasks except execution, therefore the 
manufacturer has generally a higher liability risk, and air 
carrier (for negligence of the pilot) a lower one. Under Options 
2 and 3, the reallocation of tasks is shared between the 
technology and the pilot, so that liability attribution may be 
shared as well. The fact that the air carrier (for negligence of 
the pilot) has a higher liability risk does not necessarily imply 
that the manufacturer is exonerated, since parallel actions can 
be brought to courts (see for example the various litigations 
resulting from the Überlingen accident [11], where multiple 
actors were held liable, and discussions on the ALIAS Network 
at network.aliasnetwork.eu). 
The level of automation analysis (Step 1.2) [12] showed 
that the human-machine interaction for ADS-B only design 
Options 2 and 3 are a deviation from legacy TCAS II, and shift 
responsibility to the pilot. These human factor and task 
responsibility issues may translate into product liability for 
warning defects for the manufacturer, and into pilot liability for 
negligence (and then consequently into air carrier liability). 
They may also determine enterprise liabilities upon the 
concerned organisations for having failed to provide 
appropriate training. The analysis suggests that the design of 
the information on the technology should take into account the 
liability analysis, for example, by providing detailed 
specifications on procedures to be followed by pilots or 
manuals accompanying the technology. For the pilot/Air 
Carrier the task allocation should be enshrined in legally 
relevant documentation; similarly, training requirements should 
be captured in legally relevant documentation. The same 
recommendations can be made for the ATCO/ANSP task 
allocation and training requirements.  
It emerged very clearly from the stakeholder liability 
distribution assessment (Step 3) that the design for Options 2 
and 3 was unacceptable to the pilots because of the complexity 
of accompanying procedures for both pilots and ATCos.  
During the analysis, several technical uncertainties were 
identified which are due to the low maturity stage of the 
technology. The risk concerning the reliability of ADS-B data, 
the risk of spoofing, and the effects of certification on both 
risks could not be grounded in scientific evidence. 
Demonstrating that design choices are supported by scientific 
evidence will strengthen the position of any actor whose 
liability is to be assessed in front of a court. 
For manufacturers, liability mitigation measures lowering 
the liability risk due to a design defect concretely translate into 
the need to ground the technology design on scientific studies. 
Specific concerns here are: (i) the reliability of ADS-B data in 
general, and (ii) the exposure of ADS-B signals to spoofing. 
The following measures are suggested: to explore effects of 
certification on safety, and to explore safety mechanism 
designs to limit exposure to ADS-B safety. For addressing a 
warning defect risks, manufacturers should take care to design 
adequate warning information to accompany the technology. 
Furthermore, specific liability mitigation measures may 
strengthen manufacturers’ defences, in particular by adopting 
common industry standards, as the industry standard may be 
regarded as the adequate state of the art. Manufacturers must 
assess the impact of potential discretion and lack thereof left in 
a given technology standard [13]. 
Several allocation measures could possibly limit the 
liability of manufacturers. In particular, allocation can be 
shifted through contractual clauses. These were identified as 
particularly relevant for (i) the software component of ACAS X 
that is developed by an outside software producer (ii) 
additional services such as installation, maintenance etc. 
Further, (iii) insurance clauses may be relevant. For example, it 
should be checked whether incidents caused by spoofing are 
covered by insurance policies. 
In order to limit exposure to subsequent liabilities, it is 
recommended that decisions taken in particular by 
standardisation bodies and manufacturers are demonstrably 
based on scientific studies. ADS-B data issues and in particular 
spoofing are general issues of aviation technologies, and are 
therefore beyond the scope of the particular EUROCAE 
Working Group responsible for the development of ACAS X 
standards. In this respect, the concern from the standard setter 
appears to be that (a) there are no scientific studies on the 
‘spoofing’ issue, which is a non-specific issue to ACAS X, (b) 
the certification does not concern the reliability or spoofing 
proofness of the ADS-B device, and (c) Safety mechanisms 
such as encryption for enhancing ADS-B safety were rejected 
during the design process of ADS-B. 
The ADS-B reliability issue can be identified as a challenge 
for the entire socio-technical system of avionics. The Legal 
Case process elicited the limitations which the different roles of 
stakeholders place upon them, as they are constrained by 
resources, mandates, and functional assignments. The 
individual actors were therefore unable to address the ADS-B 
issue sufficiently, making it a typical issue to be addressed by 
the policy making process.  
One of the main outcomes of Step 3 was detecting the tense 
relationship between certification and liability. Airworthiness 
circles often presume that when standards are complied with, 
manufacturers are protected from liability. As the Barcelona 
Court of Appeal judgment (Überlingen)8 has recently again 
demonstrated, manufacturers can be liable even when they 
comply with all standards. These developments go hand in 
hand with EASA’s limited possibilities to control compliance, 
moving towards a system of self-certification, which 
effectively shifts a large part of the liability risk to 
manufacturers. In the face of these developments, in drafting 
                                                          
8 Audiencia Provincial (Court of Appeal) of Barcelona, Judgment n.230/2012, 
published on 8/5/2012. The Court of Appeal’s argument on manufacturer’s 
liability has been confirmed by Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) of Madrid, 
Judgment 649/2014, published on 13/01/2015  
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the standards for ACAS X, with respect to the ADS-B design, 
the standard setters should take into account the effects in 
terms of liability risk that result from the level of detail of the 
standard, and whether they provide a choice for different ADS-
B design options for the manufactures.  
Stakeholders, standard setters and certifications authorities 
should consider how standards and certification requirements 
may affect liabilities. It is true that compliance with 
certification requirements not always exonerates manufacturers 
from liability, but compliance can be used as a defence in 
product liability cases. Producers are assumed not to be liable 
for design features that are mandated by certification 
requirement and thus, a detailed certification, by reducing the 
scope for the producer´s discretion, also reduces the risks of 
producer´s liability. Moreover, the level of detail of a standard 
or certification and the relative scope for divergence of the 
manufacturer may indirectly affect the liability assessment by 
courts, since the standard or certification may be viewed as 
evidence of the ‘state of the art’ and be used as a comparator in 
the assessment of whether a party has acted negligently. 
Standardization and certification can be instrumentalized to 
affect the scope of the parties’ liability and their burden of 
proof in litigation. In order to mitigate manufacturers’ liability 
risks, a detailed standard could be written which allows only 
little or no room for discretion, possibly specifying the kind of 
information and guidance material that a product must be 
accompanied by. In turn, this high degree of specification will 
shield compliant manufacturers to some extent from liability 
claims based on product design and information defects. 
Manufacturing defects, i.e. faulty product, will still remain a 
regular legal risk. In face of the legal uncertainty regarding 
certification, regulators may introduce a shift in the burden of 
proof so that when standards are complied with, a design is 
presumed to be non-defective. Such a presumption would leave 
open the possibility of the plaintiff to rebut the presumption by 
proving that nevertheless a design defect existed.  
Concerning liability, standard setters and certification 
bodies themselves currently operate in a legal vacuum. As the 
analysis carried out through the Legal Case demonstrated, the 
potential liability is currently unclear, but it is strongly 
suggested that standard setters assess their respective level of 
duty of care critically when setting standards. On the one hand 
standard setters are restrained by resources (e.g. the possibility 
to conduct studies) and their mandate (e.g. specific 
technologies may be out of the mandate). On the other hand, 
manufacturers are restrained in their design options by the 
applicable standards. Under the current regime, the liability for 
design choices is to an important extent shifted onto 
manufacturers. It may be asked whether the currently weak 
liability of standard setters, provides insufficient incentives for 
standard setters to write safety-maximising standards. 
However, an increased liability for standard setters presupposes 
that they are provided with adequate resources. 
Finally, it is to be considered that all ACAS manufacturers 
are from the US. This is expected to significantly affect the 
projected liability risk for damages, as in the US damages are 
often higher that in Europe. The current trend is for losses to 
become more expensive. In discussions with members of the 
user group, the relevance of spoofing for insurance 
underwriters was highlighted and the importance of buyback of 
exclusionary clauses such as “War, Hijacking and Other Perils 
Exclusion Clause” (AVN48B) was discussed as a liability 
displacement measure.  
Overall, the potential reduction in insurance premiums 
depends on documented safety improvements and to some 
extent on “legal risk” such as case law on ACAS technologies. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the validation confirm that the Legal Case 
methodology is generally easy to use and to follow and that it 
could be successfully introduced in the aviation domain. The 
use of the Legal Case and its supporting tools (including the 
LOAT) helped to identify the differences between the different 
design options in terms of automation and resulting liability 
risks for all the actors involved. The outcome of the legal 
analysis carried out with the Legal Case, namely the list of 
possible legal measures for new aviation systems, was 
considered relevant and useful by the aviation stakeholders 
who participated in the validation process. In particular, results 
of the legal analysis may support standardisation bodies and 
policy makers (e.g. EUROCAE WG75) in developing a 
complete insight of the introduction of a new technology, 
integrating such results with those coming from the safety 
analysis, the human factor analysis, etc. 
The results of the validation will be an input to the 
consolidation of the Legal Case methodology and to the release 
a self-standing and ready to use tool at the end of the project. 
In the future, the links between the Legal case and other 
SESAR Cases, in particular the Safety Case, and the Human 
Performance Case will be developed. Moreover, software tools 
will be provided, so as to automate part of the Legal Case 
process and to support a collaborative assessment of liability 
issues in multi-disciplinary teams. 
REFERENCES 
[1] SESAR Joint Undertaking, The European ATM Master Plan, Oct. 2012 
[2] SESAR Joint Undertaking, The SESAR Target Concept 
[3] Contissa G., Sartor G., Lanzi P., Marti P., Tomasello P., "Liabilities and 
automation in aviation", in Schaefer, Dirk (ed) Proceedings of the 
SESAR Innovation Days (2012) EUROCONTROL. 
[4] Sartor G., Contissa G., Schebesta H., Laukyte M., Marti P., Lanzi P., 
Tomasello P., “The Legal Case”, Proceedings of the 2nd ATACCS 
Conference, Naples (Italy), May 28-30, 2013 
[5] Contissa G., Laukyte M., Sartor G., Schebesta H., Masutti A., Lanzi P., 
Marti P., Tomasello P., Liability and automation: Issues and challenges 
for socio- technical systems. Journ. of Aerospace Ops, 2:79–98, 2013. 
[6] B. Buley, J. Stuart Searight, T. Troast, and H. Moses, “Minimum 
operational performance standards for traffic alert and collision 
avoidance systems airborne equipment,” RTCA Paper No. 090-14/ 
SC147-779, April 7, 2014. 
8
 
 
Fifth SESAR Innovation Days, 1st – 3rd December 2015
 
 
[7] R. G. Buley, J. Stuart Searight, S. Plummer, and D. Tillotson, “Traffic 
alert and collission avoidance system,” revision 11, RTCA Paper No. 
084-13/PMC-1080, March 20, 2013.  
[8] EUROCONTROL, E-OCVM Version 3.0 Volume I, February 2010. 
[9] Costin A., and Francillon A., “Ghost in the air: on insecurity of ADS-B 
protocol and practical attacks on ADS-B devices,” Black Hat USA, 2012 
[10] Save L., Feuerberg B. (2014), Designing Human Automation 
Interaction: a new level of Automation Taxonomy, Proceedings of 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Conference 2014 
[11] German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation. 
Investigation Report AX001-1-2. 2004-05- 02. 
[12] Contissa G., Sartor G., Laukyte M., Schebesta H., Lanzi P., Marti P. and 
Tomasello P., ‘Classification and Argumentation Maps as support tools 
for liability assessment in ATM’, Proceedings of the SESAR Innovation 
Days (2013) EUROCONTROL. 
[13] A. U. Košenina, 'Aviation Product Liability: Could Air Carriers Face 
their ‘Life and Limb’ being Placed in Peril for the Exclusivity of the 
Montreal Convention?' (2013) 38 Air and Space Law, Issue 3 
 
9
